A World Outer Space Prison: A Proposal by Kutner, Luis
Denver Law Review 
Volume 45 Issue 5 Article 2 
April 2021 
A World Outer Space Prison: A Proposal 
Luis Kutner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Luis Kutner, A World Outer Space Prison: A Proposal, 45 Denv. L.J. 702 (1968). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
A WORLD OUTER SPACE PRISON:
A PROPOSAL
By Luis KUTNER*
The inadequacies of present incarceration methods in terms of
prisoner rehabilitation and inefficient utilization of manpower
resources have often been discussed by modem penologists. The
present emphasis on prisoner reformation is to some degree in con-
flict with basic penological concepts of punishment and isolation
of criminals from society. Professor Kutner suggests in this article
that advancing space technology will someday allow for the realiza-
tion of an alternative to present prisons-a world outer space
prison for future institutionalization of criminals. The recent success
of Apollo 8 astronauts in orbiting the Moon and returning to Earth
and the projected mission of the crew of Apollo 11 to land an
American on the Moon's surface in July of 1969 adds a distinct
aura of possibility to his suggestion. He discusses the historical
precedent of banishment and then notes the lack of any substantial
legal obstacles in establishing his proposed prison. Certainly, Pro-
fessor Kutner's thesis is a novel and interesting proposal for solution
of the ever-growing problems of penal reform in the world today.
I. THE PROPOSAL
T HIS article proposes the establishment of an orbital world
prison' at the turn of the 20th century, to hold the entirety of the
planet's population of felons.2 The proposal for such a United
A member of the Illinois Bar and the Indiana Bar; former visiting Associate Professor,
Yale Law School; Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee, World Peace Through
Law Center; Chairman, Commission for International Due Process of Law; former
Consul, Ecuador; former Consul General, Guatemala; former Special Counsel to the
Attorney General of Illinois; and author of numerous law journal articles and several
books, including World Habeas Corpus and I, the Lawyer. The author wishes to
acknowledge the research assistance of Stuart Weisler.
1 The term "'orbital" is used within the context of this paper to denote both natural
orbiting bodies such as the Moon, and those made by man.
2 It must be noted at the outset that short term incarceration will still be handled on
the Earth.
The term "felon," as used within the scope of this work, shall only include those
mentally responsible for their acts, and is not to include those sentenced to very short
term incarceration. In addition, as will be noted later in the text, special provision
will be made for those incapable of rehabilitation.
Most people today think of banishment, if at all, only in relation to fiction,
antiquity, or both. "The device of thrusting out of the group those who have broken
its code is very ancient and constitutes the most fearful fate which primitive law could
inflict. The offender.., was driven forth naked into the wild." Plucknett, Outlawry,
11 ENCYC. Soc. Sc'. 505 (1933). Genesis relates that Adam and Eve were banished
from Eden, and "it has indeed been contended that the mark set on Cain was not so
much a miraculous or talismanic sign for the protection of his life, as a sign probably
connected with one of the most ancient of all forms of judicial punishment [-banish-
ment]." Fink, Crimes and Punishments Under Ancient Hindu Law, 1 L. MAGAZINE &
REV. (4th Ser.) 321, 333 (1875). The ancient civilizations of Babylon (F. HARPER,
THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON 55 (1904) (154 of the Code)), Greece
(Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 205 (1956)),
and Rome (E. SUTHERLAND & D. CWESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 268 (1960) )
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Nations penal colony is set forth, not for any intrinsic romance it
might be thought to possess, but as a practical solution to the peno-
logical problems presently existing in the world and those which we
may expect to arise as a result of the growth in world population.
The United States is already dedicated to the creation of a space
station in the form of a Manned Orbital Laboratory' and to the
exploration and utilization of the Moon. Public discussion may lead
to a recognition that the physical remoteness of outer space may also
serve a useful penal purpose.
Briefly, the outer space prison envisioned would be a permanent
space station, created by a treaty-statute and administered by an
international agency. Through the soilless growth of plants and
edible algae, it would be self-sufficient in food and oxygen but
dependent on the Earth for such necessities as medical supplies and
electrical equipment. No opportunity would be allowed for the seizure
of a space vehicle by a convict and his return to Earth. For that reason
the prison would offer a more nearly perfect deterrent than can be
provided by any prison from which an inmate can contemplate
escape. Within its confines the prison could afford the inmates
relative liberty of movement and normal family and sexual relations
since prisoners' families could be allowed to accompany them if they
wished. Also, prisoners might marry and begin their families while
in prison. The odious apparatus of bars and walls could be greatly
reduced or done away with altogether. Thus, the world outer space
prison would represent a kind of "leveling up" for the world prison
population, an incarceration under more humane conditions than one
would reasonably expect the majority of them to have known. The
proposed institution should be attractive to those seeking the broadest
employed banishment, and England made extensive use of it for centuries. By the
midnineteenth century, however, the English lost interest in banishing citizens. "No
power on earth, except the authority of Parliament, can send a subject of England,
not even a criminal, out of the land against his will." 4 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 298 (1795).
At the time the union was formed, banishment did not appeal to the United
States, which had so recently been used as a depository for Europe's "refuse."
The idea of such laws would have been repulsive to men of that time [1789].
Banishments were a thing of the remote past .... Very likely the Constitution
would have failed of ratification if the members of the state conventions
had been told that the proposed national government would be able to throw
people out of this country.
Z. CHAFEE, supra at 205-06. The practice was not entirely repugnant to the
colonists, however, as is illustrated by the cases of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchin-
son. See W. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 135 (1954).
"Banishment, however, did not go the way of the pillory and the whipping post.
Although banishment of a citizen from the country has in recent years been no more
than a theoretical possibility, at the state level banishment exists as a practical fact
.... Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
758-59 (1963). See also Simsarian, Outer Space Cooperation in the United Nations,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1963).




possible scope for prison reform. In addition, the world outer space
prison would offer a uniform "total" reform, rather than a piecemeal,
country-by-country reform.
Reformers are looking for a system of penology which will
better accomplish the tasks penal institutions are supposed to serve.
The most basic of these tasks is the removal of the criminal from
society for the proper period of time. The remoteness of space cer-
tainly accomplishes this purpose. A prison in which one is incarcerated
is punitive, wherever it might be located, thus satisfying another of
the commonly accepted purposes of penal institutions. The purpose
which our present system of penology has failed to accomplish is
that of rehabilitation. Perhaps the use of outer space for the incar-
ceration of prisoners will present an opportunity for the accomplish-
ment of this task.
In modern times, prison officials agree that all prisoners who can
work, should work.4 There appears to be disagreement as to what
the purposes of convict labor should be,- but rehabilitation should
be one such purpose. In addition to keeping prisoners active so they
do not become animals in a cage, prisoners should be taught skills
which will be of assistance to them upon their release. The emphasis
in such labor should be on teaching inmates to work for a living
upon release and to discipline themselves in their work. However, no
prison system presently can supply the vast majority of prisoners with
useful jobs or the incentive to do a job well. Many penal institutions
are unable to supply all prisoners with even useless tasks.
There is a possible solution to this situation in a prison in outer
space. At the end of the 20th century, the governments of Earth will
find it necessary to colonize the Moon. At that time there will be
important tasks to be performed on the Moon's surface. Some of these
tasks, such as construction and mining, although unusual in the mode
of performance, will be familiar to the prisoners, but many will be
entirely new, such as farming without soil. If prisoners were to be
used as the initial colonists on the Moon, there would be ample work
to be done by all. The work would be necessary to their survival and
necessary to the people of Earth. The prisoners would have a special
importance to themselves and to Earth, the psychological benefits of
which could be tremendous. The training given will have untold
benefit. Since the prison will have to be reasonably self-supporting,
the prisoners will be required to learn nearly all trades and profes-
sions. Prisoners will be given a feeling of adequacy and accomplish-
4 N. CANTOR, CRIME AND SOCIETY 145 (1939).
5 1d.
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ment which is necessary to their rehabilitation, and which cannot be
given to them on Earth.6
Many penologists believe that one of the best ways to rehabili-
tate an antisocial person is to train him to live in a society of rules
which he helps to promulgate. Self-discipline in prison life is perhaps
the most progressive reform ever suggested for penal institutions.
Self-government systems have been attempted several times, but all
have been abandoned. However, some actually worked well,7 and
many penologists of this century still feel that with proper super-
vision, the system can succeed. "It is probable . . . that the most
effective agency in advancing the cause of the reformation of the
criminal . . . [isl the education of the prisoner for a normal life after
his release." ' The principle behind inmate self-government is that
one learns by doing.
One basic objection to self-government is that people in prison
have already demonstrated their lack of self-control. There are two
important answers to such an objection.' First, many convicts have a
great deal of self-control but have used it for antisocial purposes.
Second, with regard to those persons who lack self-control, the self-
government system is more likely to remedy their deficiency so that
they may become useful members of society. A system that thinks
for the prisoners in every respect, and which teaches them nothing
about social coexistence, fails in its objective of inculcating prisoner
self-control.
The principle of self-government would find its best chance for
success in a prison which would require minimum restraint on pris-
oners' physical activity and in which normal family and social rela-
tionships might be continued. Self-government is an effort to train
persons in the art of living in concert. "It implies a strengthening of
the ability to exercise one's own faculties - something needed might-
ily in the world at large. It implies freedom to choose one's own
friends, to dispose of one's leisure hours, to order one's own life....
Under the autocratic system of prison government the faculties of
inmates are kept in abeyance or killed outright."' 1 "Self-government
seeks to rescue the prisoner from this. . . . Such a regime sets up a
new fealty for the prisoner to guide his life .... The new fealty at
which self-government aims is loyalty to the whole body of pris-
oners."'" Certainly, a colony on the Moon, having the common goals
of mutual dependency and working together, would have the greatest
6Id. at 151.
7 F. WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION 375 (1918).
8 Id. at 365.
9Id. at 373.
'ld. at 365.
1 Id. at 371.
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opportunity to develop an individual's loyalty to the entire group.
It must be noted that not all prisoners will be sent to prison on
the Moon. Prisoners who are incorrigible and cannot be reformed12
will be placed in an "Alcatraz in Space." This will be an orbiting
space station in typical prison style. The entire prison can be controlled
and observed from Earth by closed circuit television. With our
expected advances in technology by the end of this century, the only
prison personnel necessary will be repairmen for computers and
wiring should there be malfunctions and a medical and psychiatric
staff to treat the prisoners for physical ailments and mental problems.
Necessary supplies and food will be delivered by spacecraft, but no
prisoner will be allowed access to the unloading area until after the
spacecraft has left.
At the present time the prison population in the United States
is some 300,000 individuals, or approximately 0.014% of the total
population.'3 Were the American average to obtain for the world,
approximately 3,500,000 persons would now be behind bars. With
the expected growth in overall population,14 the end of this century
will see a world prison subculture of some seven to ten million people.
The use of habitable space in an overcrowded world for the socially
negative task of housing these numbers may still be possible at the
end of the century in states possessing extensive internal hinterlands.
However, smaller states will doubtless be attracted by any scheme that
can free land within their borders. Many of these smaller states have
already had experiences, unlike the United States, in the physical
seclusion of prisoners in remote penal settlements. They may see the
idea of a prison in space as a reasonable alternative to use of their
land for long term incarceration. 5
II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE PENAL COLONY
The penal colony is not an institution well known to Americans.
Nevertheless, the permanent or temporary exile of felons is quite old
in common law. From quite early times people have been banished
from England l6 for a variety of crimes, usually political, and trans-
12 Failure to exclude such persons from the early self-government experiments is com-
monly stated to have been a major cause of their failure or limited success. See N.
CANTOR, supra note 4, at 154; F. WINES, supra note 7, at 374-75.
13 NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 692 (1967).
14 G. HARDIN, POPULATION, EVOLUTION, AND BIRTH CONTROL 98 (1964).
15 As Ricardo would say, it is not necessary that the construction of an extraterrestrial
prison be cheap; it is only necessary that land be extremely dear so that the cost of the
prison be at least of the same order of magnitude as the cost of developing a previ-
ously unused land area. If the costs are at all comparable, the noneconomic advantages
of the orbital prison may be expected to exert a great persuasive force on the feasi-
bility of such a project.
16 E. ROBSON, THE CONVICT SETTLERS OF AUSTRALIA 5 (1965).
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portation of a sort was sanctioned by an Act of Parliament during the
reign of Elizabeth I and was permitted under the Poor Law."
Acts of 1585,"' 1593,'" and 159820 prescribed banishment for
Jesuits, Popish adherents, and "rogues," allowing courts to send them
beyond the seas to such places as the Privy Council might appoint.2
By the time of the American Declaration of Independence, transpor-
tation of criminals had become "a major ingredient of English criminal
law."22 It had arguably established itself among those common law
powers retained by the new government after the Revolution. 23
Common law was also acquainted with the punishment of banish-
ment to the galleys by which a prisoner was kept off of English soil
and confined to a floating platform until the expiration of his
sentence.
Transportation in the strict sense was established by an Act
of Parliament in 171724 which declared that to rectify the "great want
of servants" in the colonies and to deter crime at home, certain classes
of felons would henceforth be punished by transportation abroad for
life. Previously, transportation had usually been only for a period
of years.25 To that extent, the English law was familiar with the use
of the American colonies not merely as places of permanent exile but
also as penal colonies for temporary exclusion.2"
During the period of 1717-1776, a number of Acts of Parliament
expanded the power of transportation, and it appears that about
30,000 persons were banished during that time.27 With the outbreak
of hostilities in America the practice ceased for a time. Then, in
1779, Parliament gave courts the power to banish felons "beyond
17 Poor Law of 1562, 5 Eliz., c. 3.
18 27 Eliz., c. 2 (1585).
19 35 Eliz., c.2 '(1593).
20 39 Eliz., c. 4 (1597).
21 N. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES 23 (1966).
2 2 Id. at 25.
2 It is not clear whether a power to banish resided intrinsically in medieval courts or
was established by Act of Parliament. A number of older writers, including Black-
stone, deny that transportation existed at common law, while others assert that it may
have so existed. See M. McKISACK, THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, 1307-1399, at 487
(1959). However, it is common doctrine that certain Acts of Parliament of the same
time period as the enactment of the first transportation Acts have been incorporated
into the American common law, e.g., the Statute of Wills and the Statute of Frauds.
244 Geo. 1, c. 11 (1717).
25 N. SHAW, supra note 21, at 23.
26 The concept of the penal colony does not imply that the entirety of the colony be a
prison or even that there be any prison within the colony. Both the Tsarist penal
settlements and the French settlements in French Guiana allowed in some circum-
stances relative liberty of movement and "normal" family relations. Thus, the fact
that Jamaica as a whole was not a penal settlement does not prevent us from seeing
that the English law used it as one. For a further discussion of the life of the "free"
convict see BOURDET-PLEVILLE, JUSTICE IN CHAINS (1960).
27 A. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE 5 (1947).
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the seas, ' 28 which by this time meant Australia. It should be noted
that the physical remoteness of Australia placed this penal colony
at the greatest distance achievable under the technology of the time.
Convicts composed the majority of the population of Australia
well into the 19th century. "As late as 1841," one authority has
written, "approximately one-fifth of the population of New South
Wales was described as 'bond' and twenty years previously the pro-
portion of transported convicts had been only slightly less than that
described as 'free.' "29 It is striking that the original justifications of
the system of transportation were the same as some of those ° which
could be made for a world prison in space: (1) the economic ration-
ality in moving men from an area of overpopulation; and (2) its
relative humaneness (transportation was seen even in this period as
a reform, since the alternative then was hanging)1
The deportation of felons was a familiar aspect of the contin-
ental systems as well as of the common law. France began the practice
in 1797 with the exile of a number of political prisoners to French
Guiana and continued this practice with some interruptions until
World War 11.2 During the last century, Italy maintained the
punishment of deportation to coastal agricultural colonies and during
the Fascist period sent political prisoners to nonagricultural islands
near Sicily. In Russia the exile of political prisoners to Siberia began
with an order by Peter the Great in 1710. Convicts were also trans-
ported to Sakhalin and to Turkistan. The Netherlands maintained
penal settlements in Batavia, the Moluccas, and the Penguin Isles.
Denmark had utilized Greenland at one time for penal purposes, and
both Chile and Ecuador have kept such colonies on Pacific isles. Thus,
it is apparent that the physical exclusion of prisoners (which may
have had its origin in a primitive desire to remove them from sight)
was a device used quite commonly until our generation. It was used
not just by despots or barbaric nations but also by civilized and
progressive states. Many of the colonies, however, either from
their natural unhealthy conditions or the lapses in administration
caused by their distance from the seat of government, degenerated.
They became brutal and degrading, and developed conditions of the
sort associated with the name "Devil's Island." In England the
2819 Geo. 3, C. 74, § 1 (1779).
2 9 N. SHAw, supra note 21, at 153. It should be remembered, however, that the felons
transported may have been a group unrepresentative of criminal behavior by modern
standards. Felonies in 18th century England included a great number of crimes we
should now consider petty and not indicative of an antisocial character as well as a
number of political crimes. A majority of the transportees appear to have been
convicted of various kinds of theft. Id.
30 As mentioned earlier, there are other perhaps more persuasive justifications for the
suggested prison space.
8
1 G. GRUENHUT, PENAL REFORM (1948).
21id. at 137.
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abuses connected with the "lending out" system of renting convict
labor in Australia led to the Penal Servitude Acts of 1853 and 1857
which abolished the system of penal transportation.1 3 Similar legisla-
tion has been enacted in several countries.
If the penal colony is to be resurrected in the humane and novel
form proposed by this article, it will be necessary to address attention
to the legislation by which the various governments have divested
themselves of the power to transport convicts. It will also be necessary
to combat the significant and justifiable public prejudice created by
abuses of this penal tool in the past.
On the whole, international law has accorded treatment of
prisoners to the exclusive concern of municipal law, even when
movement of prisoners between nations is involved. Certain exceptions
to this rule have evolved. For example, there is the case of conduct
called "denial of justice" 4 whereby one state becomes liable to an-
other for tortious acts committed by its officials against a national
of another state in administering its system of justice. Nevertheless,
with regard to the right of a national penal system to transport pris-
oners either internationally or to outer space, it seems that the older
view making it the exclusive concern of municipal jurisprudence is
still the dominant doctrine. Since the foundations of state power
lie in the power to penalize, no power is more jealously guarded by
states, and nowhere is the concern of others more quickly rebuked.
Presently, international law does not forbid national participation
in a joint extraterrestrial prison. The concept of the prison is merely
33 One other major objection and cause of failure of the penal colony in Australia (as
well as penal colonies elsewhere) was that raised by the law-abiding residents to the
forcing of prisoners upon their developing society. It is evident that there is no society
on the Moon to raise such an objection.
34See Lisistyn, The Meaning of the Term 'Denial of Justice' 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 632
'(1936) ; Fitzmaurice, The Meaning of the Term 'Denial of justice 1932 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 93; A. FREEMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL
OF JUSTICE (1938). In some cases the tortious act has consisted merely of a refusal
to grant access to a court or to grant a judgment; in others a tort is said to be com-
mitted when the administration of justice (including the amenities offered by the
prison system) fall below some standard (see W. BISHOp, INTERNATIONAL LAW 643
(1962)), even if nationals of the offending state are treated in no different fashion.
The theory on which the recovery is founded is sometimes an obligation on the part
of the state to behave in accordance with the demands of universal equity and some-
times a claim by the offended state that its dignity and welfare have been wronged
by the wrong done its national (W. BISHOP, supra at 641-47). In either instance the
essence of the claim is the alien nationality possessed by the individual in the offend-
ing state's judicial or penal system. This derives from the reluctance of traditional
international law to admit that individuals could have juridical existence for the pur-
pose of making claims. In addition the International Declaration of Human Rights
(G.A. Res. of Dec. 10, 1948, 3(1) U.N. GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810) contains
certain clauses touching upon penal conditions, such as Article 5 - forbidding "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" and Article 9-forbidding "arbi-
trary arrest, detention or exile," but the Declaration is in no sense a binding agree-
ment. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, United States Representative on the Human Rights
Commission of the Economic and Social Council, said with regard to the effect of the
Resolution: "It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It does not purport
to be a statement of legal obligation." U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 19, General
Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights 751 (1948).
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an extension of the earlier penal colonies, which were not attacked
by any state as invalid under international law. Prisoners of war,
however, may present a special problem in the interpretation of the
special conventions regulating the incarceration to which they may be
subjected.35 Similar to aliens who are "denied justice," such prisoners
are in the special class of those tinged with an international interest
by definition. Provision for their special treatment does not contra-
dict the general rule of noninterference in matters of domestic penal
administration.
III. A WORLD PRISON AND OUTER SPACE LAW
We must consider the legality of a world prison in outer space
law, since there probably will be no unanimity among the nations in
this venture. As a basic principle, it may be said that the use of outer
space for the placement of penal satellites, just as for any other non-
harmful purpose, is a lawful activity which does not infringe on the
right of any state.3 6 Support for this principle is to be found both in
the declarations of states and in their practice. During the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year and for more than 14 months thereafter,
states launched a variety of missiles and space vehicles in the belief
that space was a res communis omnium which might be investigated
by all, regardless of the national territory traversed by the vehicle
during the course of its flight. General acceptance of this practice
enabled the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space to find as early as 1959 that outer space was "freely
available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing
or future international law or agreements."
3 7
This view is logically unavoidable. "It would be quite impossible
to consider a situation in which a spacecraft orbiting at more than
17,000 miles an hour found itself theoretically subject to one rule over
the high seas and a different one over a subjacent state."3' 8 While a
space station can be placed in a stationary orbit in relation to a posi-
35 Since the World Prison would meet the rather minimal physical standards of the
various P.O.W. Conventions prima facie, the chief question would be whether con-
finement in the extraterrestrial prison could be said to violate any of the general
clauses against cruel treatment which the Conventions normally contain, and whether
any international or national tribunal would be empowered to hear the complaint.
See McGinniss, International Bill of Rights for Prisoners of War, 2 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 158 (1953).
36 For an authoritative account of the growth of this principle see M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL, & I. VLAsic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 323-59 (1963). More
recent discussions of this point include Cooper, Legal Problems of Spacecraft in
Airspace, FESTSCHRIFT FUER OTTO RIESE 465 (1964); Goedhuis, Conflicts of Law
and Divergencies in the Legal Regimes of Air Space and Outer Space, 109 RECUEIL
DE COURS DE L'AcADEMIC DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 263. A somewhat divergent
view is proposed by the Soviet author Hlestov in The Elaboration of Space Law Norms,
SOVETSKOE GOSUSARSTVE I PRAVO 67-75 (No. 6, 1964).
37 14 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, U.N. Doc. A/4141 (1959).
38 Cooper, supra note 3, at 1140.
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tion on Earth and thus avoid the problem of territorial violation after
its placement, there is no way to avoid such violations in the time
between launching and final position in space. Fortunately, the
ancient example of the first res communis, the ocean, and the
concurring judgments of the great powers have enabled the world
to escape attempts to bar the use of any part of outer space to
any state or for any peaceful purpose. A noted authority on the
law of outer space states, "Slowly and inexorably we are coming to
accept the fact that legal status of outer space and the high seas
differs very little, if at all. Historically, it should be noted that the
space above the high seas has long been accepted as having the status
of the seas themselves.1
3 9
This principle of free access, which we may here designate as
the principle of nonappropriation, protects the use of outer space
by any state for such nonmilitary purposes as the seclusion and con-
finement of felons. The principle is founded not merely in the
absence of protest during and since the International Geophysical
Year, but also in several sweeping and unhesitating statements made
by spokesmen for various nations in the forum of the United Nations
General Assembly. The principle of nonappropriation was reaffirmed
in the Resolution passed by the General Assembly on December 20,
1961, under the title "International Co-operation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space.''40 This Resolution, which Vlasic calls a "land-
mark in the evolution of basic legal principles relating to the explora.
tion and use of outer space, ' 41 may be taken with some reservations
as declarative (if not binding in itself) of the current state of the rights
and duties which nations claim to be associated with traffic in outer
space.42
A number of authors have regarded this and later resolutions
(to be discussed below) as having a binding power; as unanimous
declarations of the law, they are thought to express the assent of
nations, despite the absence of the usual formalities which attend
international agreement. Some hesitancy, however, is in order when
dealing with what one scholar calls "instant" international customary
law.43 Resolutions are not binding qua resolutions, even if they are
39 Id. at 1139.
40 G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR 15, U.N. Doc. A/5026 (1961).
41 Vlasic, The Growth of Space Law 1957-65: Achievements and Issues, YEARBOOK OF
AIR AND SPACE LAW 365 (1967).
42 See also The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR 6, U.N. Doc.
A/5656 (1963). In many ways, the Declaration is more significant than G.A. Res.
1962, supra note 40. Jenks, for example, calls it The Twelve Tables of the Law of
Space (SPACE LAw, 1965), but there is no need to examine it here in detail since it
affirms the principle of nonappropriation declared by the earlier Resolution.
43 Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant' International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
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reached after a degree of negotiation and discussion that commonly
accompanies the formation of treaties. Nevertheless, it is certain that
states may bind themselves unilaterally by the expression of a suffi-
ciently clear intention to be bound by the content of the resolution.
The problem is to determine whether this description fits the facts
of a particular case. Only France has as a matter of course denied
any binding force to these resolutions.44 Other states, including the
Soviet Union, seem willing to admit varying degrees of legal signifi-
cance to these expressions of general opinion and desire. The Soviets,
for example, while not explicitly repudiating declarations made on
the floor of the General Assembly with unanimous consent, requested
that the principle of outer space law be formalized in an agreement,
a request to which the United States and others ultimately acceded
by formulation of a Space Treaty.
45
It is not within the scope of this article to consider whether the
formulation of principles such as nonappropriation in a treaty must
be considered as implicit admissions by the signatories that the prior
statements made through the United Nations General Assembly
lacked the binding force of a treaty. It should be noted, however, that
this distinction between treaties and carefully prepared unanimous
resolutions, a distinction which may be called orthodox, has been
repudiated by a number of writers. Thus, Professor Sohn states, "If
most U.N. members backed ...a declaration while abstentions or
objections were few, by this very fact it becomes law. ' 46 Also, Mr.
Abram Chayes, formerly Legal Advisor to the Department of State,
has said in discussing this question:
Whatever the source may be, the United States accepts these prin-
ciples (those of the Resolution) as stating the law, and I suspect
that most other States would also. We have witnessed in this field a
significant and novel kind of law-making activity that has established
a sound and useful basis for more intensive legal development and
that is attributable in a large presence and action of international
organization.
47
If Mr. Chayes is correct in saying that the Resolution "states the
law," we may say that the principle of nonappropriation (which is
essential to confirm the legitimacy of the construction of any perma-
nent space station) has been in effect in an overwhelming majority of
all nations since December 1961.
44 See ANNOTATED REVIEW OF U.N. AFFAIRS, 1962-63, at 95 (Swift ed.).
45 Id.
46 Id.
4 A. Chayes, International Organization and Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFER-
ENCE ON THE LAW OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 58 (Chicago,
May 1963). The opinion of Mr. Chayes is followed by many authorities. See Vlasic,
supra note 41, for a gathering of them.
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The Resolution of the General Assembly passed on December 13,
1963, 48 like that of December 20, 1961, declared that international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, furnishes the principles
which shall guide the extraterrestrial conduct of states. It affirmed that
states are liable for their acts in outer space, whether those acts are car-
ried out by the states themselves, by nongovernmental agencies, or by
international organizations. Thus, an attempt is made to incorporate all
past international law by reference. States are not assumed to have
greater or different powers above the ionosphere than they have be-
neath it. As suggested above, the treatment of prisoners not otherwise
tinged with an international interest does not become a matter of inter-
national concern merely because the state controlling their destinies
moves them across a nonappropriable area, the ocean. The exact
language of the Resolution is: "outer space and celestial bodies are
free for exploration and use by all states on a basis of equality and
in accordance with international law." The effect of the language
is to deny that new rights are created or old rights affected by the
mere facts of extraterrestriality. Without digressing into a lengthy
analysis, it can be mentioned that the Space Treaty of January 27,
1967, through its first and second articles, reaffirms the principle
of nonappropriation.49 The placement of the reaffirmation is signifi-
cant because it demonstrates the fundamental character of the
principle of nonappropriation. Logically, the "openness" of space
to all must be considered a primary hypothesis without which the
matter cannot be carried further. This fact has been recognized by
states since the days of Sputnik, and it may be assumed that the
principle will still be in force at any later time when the construction
of a space station of immense proportions will be technically feasible.
The principle is founded on the real interests of the states participating
in spatial exploration; without it they would suffer disruptive claims
of exclusive possession. Such claims create the possibility of the
extension of violence into the cosmos. Further, the environment
beyond the ionosphere is now and will remain for some time suffi-
48 Declaration, supra note 42.
4 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967,
TAIS No. 6347; G.A. Res. 2222, 16 U.N. GAOR 13, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The importance of the treaty of course is that it reaffirms the principle of non-
appropriation in a form universally agreed to be binding. This article has not dealt
with the treaty at great length because it was felt necessary to show that the rule of
nonappropriation may have a "common law" background preceding its "statutory enact-
ment. The true significance of the resolutions preceding the Treaty is that they
demonstrate a general agreement among nations that the rule of nonappropriation is
a logical and practical necessity-which in turn suggests that the rule will still be
in force in the period to which the article mainly addresses itself, the end of the
present century. However, the problem of the relation between the Treaty and resolu-
tions is a fascinating and unavoidable one since one may expect further resolutions in
the future. See Schick, Problems of a Space Law in the United Nations, 13 INT'L AND
COMp. L.Q. 969 (1964) ; Christol, Space Stations: A Lawyer's Point of View, 4 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 488, 490 (1964).
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ciently hostile to man to make it self-evident that no artificial barriers
of nationality should stand in the way of mutual aid between crews
of space ships and between crews and ground support personnel. The
obvious analogy is found in Antarctica, where the hostility of the bio-
sphere maintains the principle of nonappropriation quite as much as
does the relative valuelessness of the land. Recognizing these facts,
states such as the United States which admit the binding character of
General Assembly resolutions have shown themselves willing to be
bound to the principle of nonappropriation from the first days of
astral exploration. Unless the conditions of travel in outer space
change beyond recognition, there is no reason to suppose that this
principle will be abandoned, nor is there reason to suspect that future
international law may specifically ban from the skies one of the uses
to which geographical remoteness has traditionally been put -the
establishment of penal colonies.
IV. AMERICAN LAW AND THE WORLD PRISON
The applicability of American municipal law to the problem
of the prison will be of the greatest importance in the construction
of the institution (whether satellite or Moon based). This is so since
it may be assumed that, even at that time, American financial and
technical assistance will be necessary to the project. If any provision
of the Constitution or later law forbids American participation, it
seems likely that the prison could literally never "get off the ground."
The obvious question is whether confinement in such an institu-
tion would violate the prohibition of the eighth amendment against
cruel and unusual punishment. It might be said, for example, that
the exile of prisoners to such a distance and their resulting incarcer-
tion in a hostile environment subjects them to unusual and dreadful
mental pain. They would be in constant danger of collision with
meteors; the long-range effect of cosmic rays might be unknown for
generations. Such arguments would stress the difficulty of escape
from the gravitational field of the Earth and the uncertainties of life
on the space station or on the Moon when that escape has been
attained.
The world prison would constitute a novel and possibly severe
form of punishment. However, the eighth amendment has never been
interpreted to mean that a new method of punishment could not be
introduced. The definition of "cruelty" must "draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society."" ° A significant case for the present inquiry is Francis
v. Resweber, 1 The petitioner, saved from death by mechanical failure
5 0 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
51 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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of the electric chair, failed in his claim that it would be cruel and
unusual to let the State of Louisiana have a second try. In a 5-4
decision the Supreme Court said that the constitutional prohibition
applied to "cruelty inherent in the method of punishment" and not
to unforeseeable accidents. The argument of the dissent that the im-
pact on the prisoner should be determinative was rejected as un-
workable.
The notion that American law does not extend to the physical
removal of offenders has no foothold in our courts. Deportation is a
common consequence of many acts, 52 and until recently, so was in-
voluntary expatriation. 3 The test of "cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment" suggests that here, as in many other areas, the Court
is referring to a "balancing" of the various elements inherent in a
particular method of punishment. The "balancing" test implies that
the Court would consider the advantages of the world prison, its
rehabilitation potential, its relative liberty of movement, and the
social relations it could offer to the prisoner. Unless American prisons
have changed beyond all recognition by the end of the century-
and such sweeping change is always difficult under a federal system
and in an area of law traditionally left to states - it is likely that
incarceration in the world prison will be an improvement in the lot
of the prisoner sent to it from the United States. At the present time,
there is only one American prison system permitting conjugal visita-
tion,54 despite evidence that the privilege of such visitation improves
morale and reduces homosexuality. If the world prison were to
embody the most advanced penal practices, it seems idle to say that
it would be regarded as "inherently cruel" merely because it is physi-
cally remote and places the inmates in some danger. No one would
doubt, for example, the power of the United States to create a civilian
prison in Alaska or a military prison at the American base in Thule,
Greenland, though in either case a power failure could mean death.
The world prison need not be seen in a different light.
Attention should also be directed to such state-federal questions
as may arise from the confinement of all prisoners in a single institu-
tion. If American participation in the world prison were thought
to be unconstitutional, or contradictive of statute, it is by no means
necessary that participation be abandoned for that reason. With
regard to conflict with statute, we must note the "Chinese Exclu-
52 For a collection of these offenses, see Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1952,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-60 (1964).
53 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 283 (1967).
54 Hopper, Conjugal Visiting in the Mississippi State Penitentiary, 29 FEDERAL PRO-
BATION 39 (1965). The author points out that in the opinion of the guards the
practice of permitting conjugal visits has reduced homosexuality and improved morale
among the inmates. It should be noted that the Mississippi practice was never a
deliberate reform, but is merely a privilege granted prisoners through custom.
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sion" case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,5" in which, after holding
that a certain Act of Congress contravened the provisions of a treaty,
the Supreme Court said: "[B]ut it is not on that account invalid or
to be restricted in its enforcement. The treaties were of no greater
legal obligation than the Act of Congress.... [T]he last expression
of the sovereign will must control." 56 If an alleged conflict arose
between an American commitment by treaty to participation in a
world prison and the Constitution, it is interesting to note that courts
are obliged to construe them "so as to give effect to both."57 While
it has been said that the treaty power does not extend so far as "to
authorize what the Constitution forbids," " this is not determinative
of whether the Constitution forbids any specific act to which the
government purports to be obliged by treaty. There is no lack of
brave language about the Court's eternal vigilance in the defense
of civil liberty,59 but on a number of occasions treaties or merely
executive agreements have been used to alter the rights and property
of states and citizens. In United States v. Pink,60 the Federal Govern-
ment brought suit in a state court to recover certain assets which it
claimed belonged to it by assignment from a foreign government.
The assignment had been made as part of an executive agreement.
The state court had opposed the attempted recovery as a confiscation,
but the Supreme Court brushed aside that point by reference to the
Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution. In addition, the
Court said that the executive agreement in controversy had the dignity
of a treaty made with consultation of the Senate. It would appear from
cases such as United States v. Pink and United States v. Belmont,
61
as well as from the more famous cases of United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,2 and Missouri v. Holland63 that individual
and state rights may be altered by treaty and by executive agreement,
despite all rhetoric to the contrary. It is entirely a matter of which
rights are in question, their political and moral significance, and the
balance of necessity which the Court reaches in considering them.
If this be accepted, it is another way of saying that the Constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court over a number of generations
has given the Executive (or at least, the Executive plus two-thirds
of the Senate) the power to affect the rights and property of indi-
55 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
56 Id. at 600.
57 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887).
58 De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
59 For example, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), where the absolute itnabl .v of
the Executive to avoid constitutional limitations is maintained even with some passion.
60315 U.S. 203 (1942).
61 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
62 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
63 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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viduals and states by international compact. The true extent of this
power is undetermined for the most part. In itself, this fact is not
overly frightening - the extent of the Presidential war power is
equally vague - and recognition of it helps to free some measure
of fear that American participation in the proposed Prison might be
limited by the impact of other governmental institutions.
Finally, were American participation to be presumptively un-
constitutional under the state of constitutional law existing at the
end of this century, it by no means necessarily follows that the Execu-
tive is forbidden to enter into a participatory agreement. Doctrine
exists to the effect that the Constitution does not require the President
and Congress to give independent consideration to the constitutionality
of actions. 4 In this view the separation of powers frees nonjudicial
authority of the need to "second-guess" the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution. "But nothing," writes Thomas Jefferson, "in the
Constitution has given them [the Supreme Court] the right to decide
for the Executive, more than the Executive has a right to decide for
them."6  The discussion referred to in the notes indicates that several
other of our most prominent Chief Executives have been of the
opinion that the President is not bound to determine in advance
and to conform his acts to what he thinks may be the attitude of the
Court. Executive action, even in plain opposition to the Court's
presumed desire, need not be futile if it is understood as an attempt
to educate and rouse public opinion. It is a common saying that,
ultimately, the Court does follow the election returns. No more
powerful device exists for the education of the public than contro-
versial Executive action.
Before concluding, it should be mentioned that attention must
be paid to the drafting of the provisions concerning the accompani-
ment of prisoners by their families. There must be no Hobson's
choice offered to the families of prisoners since that would work a
familial guilt, causing what Article III, section 3 of the Constitution
calls "corruption of the blood."
CONCLUSION
This article has proposed the construction of a space station of
immense proportions or a station on the Moon, or both, to house
the entirety of the world's felons. A review of the relevant interna-
tional, outer space, and American domestic law has revealed no signifi-
cant obstacle in law to defeat such a project. It is further urged that
the proper body to affirm the necessity of such a penal institution




and to conduct the initial studies is the United Nations. Through
its General Assembly and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, the U.N. has taken a preeminent position in the forma-
tion of outer space law from its inception. COPUOS, which possesses
both legal and scientific subcommittees of proven worth, is the
obvious forum in which the formulation of the prison's technical,
legal, and administrative problems could take place.
Ultimately, a United Nations world agency for prisons might
administer the institution for all participating states. Each state would
contribute in proportion to its ability to pay, rather than in proportion
to the number of prisoners it has contributed. To do otherwise would
penalize the poorest and most populous states and discourage their
participation in the plan. It may be assumed that prisoners from these
populous states are among those who would profit most from the
reforms embodied in the prison. Provision would also have to be
made for variance in the capacity of states to engage in the technical
task of constructing the prison.
The proposal for a world outer space prison suffers from two
problems of time. First, we are too close to some of the past's penal
colonies, and the very phrase "penal colony" still summons up justi-
fiable horror. This difficulty must be met head on; it must be gener-
ally understood that the world outer space prison would be an
attempt at prison reform on a scale previously unattainable and not
an attempt to sweep undesirables under the rug. Secondly, the current
generation is too far from the end of the century. Imaginations do
not easily leap to the period in which this proposal will be tech-
nologically commonplace. However, the distance to be covered is
only 31 years, not an age or an epoch. If that future time is reached,
and nations are still unprepared to seize the novel opportunities then
available, it will be due to the failures of imagination of the statesmen
who practice in this generation.
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